OCTOBER 2006 - REPORT ON COCOA AND FORCED CHILD
LABOR
International Labor Relief Forum
I. The Cocoa Industry Protocol: A Brief History
Over 40% of the world’s cocoa, the primary ingredient in chocolate, comes from
the West African nation of Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) i. Beginning in the late 1990s,
reports began to surface that detailed the pervasive use of abusive child labor in the West
African cocoa sector. In 2000 and 2001, media reports in the UK and US describing
child trafficking and enslavement on Ivorian cocoa farms led to a public outcry and call
for change. Chocolate industry companies, faced with a credible threat of legislative
action, sought to minimize the damage and assure chocolate consumers and lawmakers
that the industry could tackle this problem without government regulation.
Industry representatives met with concerned NGOs, labor unions, government
officials, and politicians, notably US Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) and Representative
Eliot Engel (D-NY). These consultations ultimately led to a voluntary, industry-wide
Cocoa Protocol in September 2001 that set out time-bound steps to eliminate the worst
forms of child labor and forced labor from West African cocoa farms by July 2005, and
freed cocoa companies from the threat of legislation. Despite cocoa companies’ repeated
assurance that they would meet the target date, industry largely failed to meet its
commitments and the deadline passed with the child labor situation virtually unchanged.
Although lawmakers voiced their displeasureii, cocoa companies faced no sanctions;
instead, the industry negotiated an extended deadline giving it until July 2008 to
implement a solution covering half of the cocoa-producing areas of Côte d’Ivoire and
Ghana.
From the outset, the Protocol has suffered from some serious design flaws. While
industry has specifically addressed the worst forms of child labor under ILO Convention
No. 182 and forced labor under ILO Convention 29, it has not addressed other core labor
rights in the agreement or in its activities, such as minimum age of employment under
ILO Convention No. 138. Further, the industry-led initiative fails to call for concrete
steps to ensure that farmers are getting a fair price for their product, which significantly
impacts the use of child labor, as farmers are forced to reduce production costs and rely
on the cheap labor of children.iii
II. Industry’s Primary Obligations under the Protocol
The Protocol sets forth an action plan with specific commitments for stakeholders. In
particular, the cocoa industry agreed to undertake several steps aimed at eliminating child
labor from its supply chain.
A. Establishment of a Joint International Foundation
The cocoa industry agreed to establish and fund a foundation “to oversee and
sustain efforts to eliminate the worst forms of child labor in the growing and processing
of cocoa beans...The foundation’s purposes will include field projects and a
clearinghouse on best practices to eliminate the worst forms of child labor.”iv
In 2002, the International Cocoa Initiative (ICI) was established to fulfill this duty
under the Protocol. The foundation began its work on the ground in 2003 and has
achieved some success. In an October 2006 address to the Child Labor Coalition in
Washington DC, ICI Executive Director Peter McAllister described the progress made
since the foundation’s inception. ICI currently runs a pilot program in 24 communities in
Ghana, as well as in six communities in Côte d’Ivoire. In all cases, these pilot programs
have enjoyed far more success in Ghana than in Côte d’Ivoire. ICI cites the Ivorian civil
war (2002-2004) as a major hindrance to program development in that country.v
ICI’s program work has chiefly consisted of building trust between foundation
field staff and the pilot communities, and sensitizing the communities to the concept of
exploitative child labor through training programs. Communities then voluntarily
identify child labor as an undesirable practice, and take the lead in identifying incidents
of child labor abuses. ICI subsequently supports community members’ initial steps
against exploitative child labor through facilitating dialogue with local and regional
leaders, sensitizing local media outlets to child labor issues, and motivating community
members to organize and advocate for constructive solutions. In this way, ICI attempts to
take a “bottom-up” approach to tackling child labor by educating, motivating and
supporting communities that take the lead in solving a problem they see as their own.
The foundation’s efforts have resulted in some success achieved within its
mandate. Motivated pilot communities in Ghana have been advocating for educational
improvements and have secured the services of 51 new teachers, classroom construction
and expansion projects, and significant increases in student enrollment. All 24 pilot
communities in Ghana are implementing action plans that include banning children from
areas where pesticides are being applied, improving and refurbishing classrooms and
school facilities, and returning children to schools during the week. On a national level,
ICI consulted on Ghana’s National Cocoa Child Labor Elimination Plan.vi
ICI likewise sees local communities as the best monitors and reporters of child
trafficking in the cocoa sector. Although rescue and repatriation of trafficked children
falls outside the scope of the foundation’s mandate, ICI advises its local partner
organizations upon receiving a report of child trafficking in cocoa or any other sector.
The foundation has also finished the first of three educational brochures on the topic.
These materials will target villagers, law enforcement and judiciary officials, and other
important constituencies.
In Côte d’Ivoire, ICI has partnered with MESAD (Movement for Education,
Health and Development), a local NGO that provides accommodation and needed
services to victims of the worst forms of child labor and forced labor. The foundation is
also expanding its relationship with CFRAR (Centre for Training and Research in Rural
Development), an organization that educates local communities about exploitative child
labor and works to expand access to education. ICI is helping to provide one new
CFRAR-organized school with school materials, and is helping fund the construction of
accommodations for the teaching staff. In an effort to build capacity for detecting child
labor and trafficking abuses, ICI trained 35 Ivorian Ministry of Labour inspectors.vii
ICI has had to make the most of limited resources in pursuing its mission. As
stipulated in the Protocol, Industry donors must “provide initial and on-going, primary
financial support for the foundation.”viii The organization’s total budget for 2004, its first
full operating year, amounted to 1,523,055 Swiss francs (about 1,228,350 US dollars).ix
The ICI is currently submitted a new three year funding proposal. No funding decisions
have been made yet.
B. Development and Implementation of Standards of Public
Certification
1. Background
The cocoa industry agreed that “in partnership with other major stakeholders [it]
will develop and implement credible, mutually-acceptable, voluntary, industry-wide
standards of public certification . . . that cocoa beans and their derivative products have
been grown and/or processed without any of the worst forms of child labor.”x The
chocolate industry agreed to present lawmakers with a plan to implement a monitoring
and certification system by July 1, 2005. Unfortunately, by July 2005, the Chocolate
Manufacturers Association revised its position and stated that it couldn’t fulfill the
promises it made in 2001, blaming political instability in West Africa for the failure to
implement a credible monitoring program.xi Failing to meet its promised deadline,
industry has delayed the implementation of its monitoring and certification system and a
target date for full implementation has not been set. Currently, the industry has promised
that it will monitor and certify only fifty percent of Ghana’s and Cote d’Ivoire’s cocoa-
producing areas by July 2008.xii
2. Industry Proposed Monitoring and Certification Plan
According to the industry, the child labor monitoring plan will be carried out
using methodology similar to that of a census. Local NGOs and community groups will
collect data from a statistically significant sample of West African cocoa farms,
collecting data related to labor practices and related factors that bear on the lives of cocoa
farmers and their communities, as well as noting any progress made in these areas. The
resulting information will be compiled and presented in the form of a certification report.
The Verification Working Group (VWG), an independent oversight group set up
to examine the monitoring and certification process, issued this overview of the proposed
certification system:
“According to the cocoa/chocolate industry, individual producer country governments
will issue a “certificate”. The certificate will be a statement of fact regarding West
African cocoa farming practices; providing a view of labor conditions on the ground,
progress towards improvement and an explanation of required remedial actions. The
cocoa certification system will not result in a product label. It will not guarantee that any
particular cocoa bean or bar of chocolate has been produced in a certain way. As such,
the “certificate” will reflect the certification of practices and processes at the farm and
community level with a view towards defining clearly where improvements need to occur
and progress towards those improvements. Information is not yet available about the
specific contents of the certificate, how often it will be issued, to whom it will be issued,
and what form it will take.”xiii
Industry says it is dedicating more than $5 million annually to support the full
implementation of the certification system for cocoa farming labor practices and for
programs to improve the well-being of the more than 1.5 million farm families growing
cocoa in West Africa.xiv However, it states that governments must also play a primary
role in funding. As VWG states, “Cote D’Ivoire has indicated that they plan to fund
monitoring and certification work by allocating around US $4 million from the existing
[cocoa] levy structure to these activities, which will be managed by one of the state
organisations already operating.”xv In June 2006, Industry and the Cote d’Ivoire
government announced the launching of a pilot monitoring program in Oumé province,
which is not known to have a significant problem with child trafficking. The cost of the
program is roughly $17million and would last for 15 months. There has been no
commitment by industry to fund the pilot program or any other future monitoring
program.xvi
As described more fully below, the International Labour Organization (ILO) has
begun working with the government of Ghana to establish a design for a national
monitoring system under the ILO’s West Africa Commercial Agriculture Program to
Combat Hazardous and Exploitive Child Labour program (WACAP). Though under the
Protocol the ILO is not responsible for the development and implementation of a
monitoring system, Industry has indicated that “[t]he system established in Cote d’Ivoire
will be based upon the ILO IPEC monitoring program developed in Ghana.”xvii To this
end, Industry has contributed some small amounts of funding for the WACAP program.
This funding, though, expired in early 2006.xviii
3. Verification Plan
The Verification Working Group (VWG) was established by industry to set up an
oversight mechanism to ensure that the goals of the Protocol are being carried out.
According to VWG, “[t]he verification system is an independent, third party effort to
check the integrity of the certification and monitoring system. This will include a review
of the scope of the certification and monitoring, and will include both quantitative and
qualitative assessments. The verification system will observe the certification system on
an on-going basis and monitor compliance with national law, international law, and the
Protocol/Joint Statement.”xix
VWG’s Verification System Overview Paper, published in February/March 2005,
outlines the three major objectives of the program:
1. To determine whether information presented in the certification report is
based on sound and appropriately collected data, consistent with the reality of
the child labor and forced labor situation;
2. To determine whether any conclusions drawn and any remedial action
committed to in the certification reports constitute a reasonable response to
the issues raised by the monitoring;
3. To check the degree to which any conclusions and systems of remediation
committed to in the certification reports are being effectively implemented.
VWG does not anticipate its own staff members performing verification directly;
rather, it anticipates the formation of a small nonprofit organization that will contract
with local partners on the ground. VWG will identify and train the verifiers in their tasks,
evaluate the quality of their work, and issue final verification reportxx Verifiers will use
“documented and well-defined methodologies and systematic procedures” in the course
of their work, and must have “free and continued access to all sources and places”
covered by the monitoring and certification system.xxi Other requirements include
transparent reporting of verifiers’ findings and a clear statement of the level of assurance
that verification will provide.xxii
Although the verification system will not be implemented until the monitoring
and certification system is in place,xxiii VWG has recommended for further study three
options that could be used to fund the organization’s work in a sustainable manner. The
first option would require “key companies in the cocoa supply chain” to pay a levy based
on the volume of beans purchased; the second would impose a levy on cocoa being stored
for the futures market in consuming country warehouses; and the third would add a flat
fee to trades in cocoa lots on the futures market.xxiv VWG notes that the costs of
verification should be “passed up the supply chain rather than down to farmers
themselves.”xxv
4. Independent Monitoring and Implementation Oversight
In July 2005, when the initial deadline for the implementation of industry’s
monitoring and certification plan expired unfulfilled, Sen. Harkin and Rep. Engel
announced plans to establish an independent oversight entity with the mission to monitor
the implementation of the Harkin-Engel Protocol in order to ensure accountability,
momentum and transparency on the part of industry. A university with “expertise in
African studies, child labor and business ethics” would be hired “to provide oversight of
government and private industry efforts to develop and implement mechanisms to
eliminate the worst forms of child labor (WFCL) in the cocoa sector in Côte d’Ivoire and
Ghana.”xxvi
In October 2006, USDOL/ILAB announced that the Payson Center for
International Development and Technology at Tulane University in New Orleans would
receive a $4.3 million, three-year contract.xxvii The initiative will study the health of
exploited children, train public officials in Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana to monitor the
incidence of child labor in the cocoa industry and report to the department and Congress
on the status of child labor certification, monitoring and verification systems.xxviii
According to USDOL/ILAB, “the reports will also cover efforts to establish child labor
monitoring and verification systems to assess progress made toward meeting obligations
under the Harkin-Engel Protocol.”xxix
III. Other Activities Related to Child Labor and Cocoa in West Africa
A. West African Cocoa and Commercial Agricultural Project (WACAP)
Launched in 2003 as a joint program of the United States Department of Labor
(DOL) and the International Labor Organization (ILO), with industry providing 16% of
the funding (US $1m), WACAP’s mission is to prevent and eliminate hazardous child
labor in cocoa and other agricultural industries in West Africa. WACAP will also work
in conjunction with the USAID-funded STCP program (see below), which also receives
an undisclosed amount of support from the World Cocoa Foundation.
The WACAP program will implement 30 action programs that will “(i) moblilize
participation and strengthen capacity of social partners; (ii) carry out extensive awareness
raising campaigns; (iii) demonstrate a comprehensive package of social protection
measures including counseling, education, and training; (iv) establish a credible and cost-
effective child labor monitoring system; and (v) enhance the knowledge base and
disseminate information.
WACAP has begun pilot projects aimed at establishing a National Child Labor
Monitoring System (NCLMS). This system is comprised of a network of national,
district and community level Child Labor Monitoring Committees who are charged with
the design and implementation of a feasible, credible and transparent child labor
monitoring system that will ensure that workplaces from which children have been
removed continue to remain free of child labor and that children removed from work are
participating in social protection services. The program is being pilot tested in 56
communities in five districts across Ghana and, if successful, will be the model for local
community monitoring of labor conditions on cocoa farms in West Africa.
However, the relationship between WACAP’s monitoring system, which has total
funding of only US$6m, and the monitoring program that industry has proposed is
unclear. Although Industry has stated that it will model its monitoring and certification
after the WACAP program, WACAP has explained that any credible system of
certification must include detailed farm-level components such that workplaces can be
identified clearly as free of child labor; that follow-up visits be conducted to ensure that
the farms remain child labor free; and that children who are released from labor are
participating in social protection services.xxx None of these elements appear in Industry’s
monitoring proposal described above.
The WACAP program was designed to be a supplement to the Protocol, and not
to fulfill Industry’s commitments under the Protocol. Sen. Harkin, who was able to obtain
the funding for the WACAP program through his work with the Labor, Health, and
Human Services and Education Appropriations Subcommittee, has been clear that
Industry continues to “bear the social, moral, and financial responsibility for fully
implementing the Protocol.”xxxi
Funding for the WACAP program ended in April 2006. No information is
publicly available about extension of continued funding for the three year program.
B. Sustainable Tree Crop Program (STCP) Farmer Field Schools
In 2002, United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
broadened the scope of its already existing Sustainable Tree Crop Program (STCP) to
include a child labor component in its pilot extension program for Farmer Field Schools
for cocoa farmers in Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Cameroon. The task for
developing the program was contracted to the International Institute for Tropical
Agriculture (IITA). This program has been financially supported by the USAID, the UK
Department for International Development, the Danish International Development
Agency, the Canadian International Development Agency, the Ivorian Fond de
Developpment et de Promotion des Activites des Producteurs de Café et de Cocoa, Mars
Inc., and the World Cocoa Foundation. The STCP Farmer Field School (FFS) West
Africa program was initiated in March 2003 with the first training and curriculum
development workshop, as well as training for master trainers. At this initial meeting,
country action plans were developed for the initiation of Farmer Field Schools in these
select countries.
Subsequent to the signing of the Protocol, child labor sensitization training has
been included in the STCP Farmer Field School curriculum. The content for this
curriculum was developed in coordination with the ILO’s WACAP program. The
training programs focus almost entirely on awareness-raising for three predominant
occupations that meet the definition of the worst forms of child labor: (1) the carrying of
heavy loads; (2) the use of machetes to clear fields; and (3) the application of pesticides.
The child labor sensitization program comprises only a small portion of the FFS
curriculum, which is primarily focused on agricultural training programs aimed at
increasing cocoa yields and improving on sustainable agricultural techniques in West
Africa. In this area, the STCP has claimed some success in raising cocoa yields for
participating farmers by as much as 40%. However, this success has come at a cost to the
farmers, who, in some areas, have had to more than double the amount of labor needed in
order to get just a 30% increase in yields, thus reducing overall productivity per labor
input. Furthermore, due in part to the increase volume of cocoa entering the market, a
30% increase in yields only nets a 23% increase in revenue, further increasing the overall
cost to farmers per labor input.xxxii
With respect to the child labor component of the curriculum, the STCP claims
some measure of success resulting from their child labor sensitization classes during the
Farmer Field Schools. In a survey conducted in 2005 in Ghana, the STCP reported that
there are 540 fewer children in the Atwima region in Ghana. Further, the cursory study
reported that enrollment rates for children in schools exceeded 90 percent. Of note,
however, is that education enrollment rates are positively associated with the production
output on the farms, which indicates that a change in the marketability of cocoa will have
strong effects on the education levels of the children, and many will be forced back into
the fields.xxxiii
The FFS limits the number of participants to around 30 and is selective of its
participants due to a significant lack of resources. One recommendation suggests
introducing more selection criteria for the participants, including accepting only younger
and well educated farmers for the program. Additionally, one indicator used to measure
the success of the program has been the whether the farmers are willing to pay tuition for
FFS, though it is unclear from the record whether they have had to pay any tuition. This
raises concerns that the long-term viability of FFS involves shifting the burden to farmers
to pay for training programs.xxxiv
The relationship between the STCP and the ICI remains undefined and their
efforts appear to mirror one another in many ways.
C. WINROCK International’s CLASSE Program
In 2003, Winrock International was contracted by the USDOL to establish the
Child Labor Alternatives Through Sustainable Systems in Education (CLASSE) project.
In 2004 and 2005, the World Cocoa Foundation (US$115,000), Mars Inc. ($260,000),
and the Norwegian Association of Chocolate Manufacturers ($225,000) signed
agreements with Winrock to continue support for an extension to the CLASSE program.
The goal of the CLASSE program is to strengthen formal and non-formal
education and to encourage school attendance for working children in and around cocoa
farms with the goal of reducing the “prolific” use of inefficient agricultural practices in
Cote d’Ivoire, which, they claim, increases the incidence of child labor on farms. To do
this, CLASSE emphasizes adapting vocational education in schools which includes a
curriculum of farming practices and agro-marketing as well as functional literacy for
students and community members. Winrock will be expanding the program beyond just
Ehoueguie, Cote d’Ivoire to three other schools and will develop a curriculum for grade 7
to 9. The curriculum will address agricultural education, child labor, health, and
HIV/AIDS. In addition, through the CLASSE program, Winrock has been providing
micro-credit loans as a part of its scholarship program to improve already-existing small
businesses.
The CLASSE program will also be training between 400 and 600 young people in
agricultural vocational skills while creating and maintaining a nursery used for training
and research. In addition, 3000 other young persons will be taught child labor awareness
and life-skills. The program is available to children aged 12 – 18 who are not currently in
school. Furthermore, Farmers Clubs will be established to train members in leadership
skills, public speaking and time management as well as a market study of their region for
different agricultural products.
D. Initiative for African Cocoa Communities
The IACC was established in May 2005 by Cargill, the Hershey Company, Mars
Inc., Nestle USA, the Chocolate Manufacturers Association, and the National
Confectioners Association. The IACC’s programs address education in Ghana and
Cote d’Ivoire. The programs funded through the IACC are the following:xxxv
1. The Winrock education programs funded by Mars Inc. in Cote d’Ivoire.
(see above).
2. A program supported by UNICEF and the National Confectioners
Association, which will provide afternoon schooling for children ages 8 –
12 in several districts and communities in the cocoa growing areas of
Ghana. Children will be able to attend school in the afternoon after
working in the morning.
3. Lastly, the Hershey Company is supporting a project by the International
Foundation for Education and Self-Help to provide teacher training
programs for primary and secondary teachers in the cocoa growing regions
of both Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana.
One of the above mentioned programs has been described as a school with a small
vegetable garden that “at best, might feed fewer than half the students in the school for a
few days per week. Directors of the little enterprise maintain that the tree nursery will
eventually generate money to pay for food, a necessary development since the chocolate
companies have made no commitment to long-term funding of either the nursery or
garden.”xxxvi
QUESTIONS THE COCOA INDUSTRY HAS FAILED TO ANSWER
1) Industry has specifically refused to commit, on several public occasions, to sourcing
cocoa from the pilot communities in Ghana and Cote D’Ivoire where the WACAP
and other pilot monitoring/certification programs may take effect. Moreover, in
many of these communities the cocoa trees are old, yields are decreasing and without
sustained investments in cultivating new trees, farms in the pilot regions may cease
altogether to be profitable for farmers. What kind of ongoing commitment, if any,
will industry make to monitored regions if the proposed programs take effect? How
does the industry intend to create incentives for farmers to eliminate abusive child
labor from its supply chain? What long-term commitment will the Industry make to
the farmers who participate in their program?
2) An assessment of this issue from the European Union in 2005 stated that a key
element to a credible plan is transparency of supply chain. Transparency in the
supply chain has been outright rejected as an option by the Ivoirien cocoa boards with
whom the industry works, as “an idea of the foreigners that simply gives an extra
advantage to our competitors.” To date, major buyers of West African cocoa have
refused to make public information related to their ability to trace products to supplier
farms. Will industry take the necessary steps to introduce transparency into their
sourcing operations?
3) Cote d’Ivoire’s trade privileges with the United States, under the Africa Growth and
Opportunity Act (AGOA) were revoked in late 2004. Although the exact reasons for
the suspension of privileges are not publicly known, the US government did review
information related to the problems of corruption, lack of transparency, and
expropriation of foreign property in Cote d’Ivoire. Given these extremely serious
systemic issues, what are we to make of the industry’s reliance on government-
supported efforts to work with farmers and villagers toward certification of the cocoa
industry? How credible can government-directed certification be, and how can the
government be expected to provide the necessary personnel and funding to support
such an initiative?
4) Does the industry have an alternative plan on monitoring and certification in a
situation where the government would be unable to provide such services due to lack
of finance or a strong central functioning government?
5) Other industries have been able to institute monitoring programs that utilize internal
monitors as the first line of investigation and troubleshooting on labor problems. Use
of internal, company monitors is common in the apparel and footwear industries, the
sporting goods industry, and this model has been applied to some agricultural
industries, i.e. bananas, timber and cut flowers. These industries also support a
plethora of multi-stakeholder and third-party certification initiatives, but the first test
of a company’s commitment to work in good faith with third party monitoring or
certification is in all these cases that company’s investment in hiring and training its
own staff to investigate problems in its supplier facilities. To date no company in the
cocoa industry has invested time or resources into developing internal compliance
programs. Why has internal compliance not been on the table?
6) Given that there are 10 major cocoa exporters operating in Cote d’Ivoire, amongst
which the largest ones are Cargill, Archer Daniels Midland, and Nestle, who have a
consistent network of suppliers and middlemen on the ground, what are these
companies doing, independently of the industry’s joint projects, to train and monitor
their suppliers?
• How will these individual efforts be coordinated with any other monitoring or
certification programs?
• Will industry prioritize efforts to organize farms into more easily monitored
cooperatives?
7) How does Industry define “certification”? Given the historical moment in which the
Protocol was developed (mid-2001), we assume that its reference to public
certification, as opposed to the independent third-party monitoring pioneered by other
industries, is a direct reference to the Kimberley Process for certification of diamonds.
The Kimberley process provides an independent, third-party audit process for
voluntary company certification that diamonds are not sourced from conflict zones. It
also provides for penalties for companies found in violation of the standard. In the
US, the Kimberley certification process is supported by legislation, the Clean
Diamond Trade Act.
Unlike the Kimberley process (or most other third-party certification programs), the
cocoa industry is reluctant to identify the actual product being certified. That being
the case, it remains for industry to clarify the following, as well as to define what
exactly is meant in the protocol by “certification” since the term is apparently being
used in a manner not consistent with its standard English definition:
• What is the Industry certifying exactly?
• Has Industry reached any agreements with organizations that will do the
monitoring and certification?
• At what point can the cocoa be certified free of child labor?
8) With regard to the need to assure the environmental sustainability and the social
responsibility of the cocoa sourced from Cote d’Ivoire what benchmarks must cocoa
suppliers to chocolate manufacturers and retailers meet? Who certifies compliance
with these standards?
9) It has been very difficult to trace the money involved with the various programs and
initiatives described in this memo. Our back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests
that to date, US taxpayers have spent approximately $10 million dollars toward
initiatives to deal with this problem entirely apart from the industry protocol (i.e. $5
million in US government funding for the WACAP program and an additional $4.5
million in funding for the Tulane University oversight project). To date, over a five
year period the entire chocolate industry has spent approximately $3 million toward
this subject from what can publicly be documented ($1 million for the WACAP
program, slightly over $1 million for the ICI, and an additional $1 million for various
programs related to cocoa but not necessarily related to child labor, including those
administered through the World Cocoa Foundation). Currently unaccounted for is the
$17 million needed to operate the pilot programs, of which Cote D’Ivoire committed
to paying $4million. What is the cost of establishing a comprehensive monitoring,
certification, and verification program, and what will industry commit to pay for these
costs? What “resources” will Industry provide to fund the monitoring, certification
and verification operations?
• How much money? Who will receive the money?
• Will industry provide other types of resources?
• Who else besides Industry will be providing resources? How much?
• How will they ensure that funds or other resources are spent properly?
10) Industry has a proven track record of promising to farmers that, if they change their
practices and invest their own money in making the change, then the farmers will
profit greatly through sales to the companies. Sadly, the companies have a history of
failing to meet their commitment or shifting production to other countries. If farmers
can show they are complying with good labor practices, will Industry commit to
buying from them through long-term contractual arrangements?
• Will Industry provide participating farmers with contracts?
• Will Industry commit to paying farmers a price commensurate with a higher
cost of production? OR
• Will Industry just simply move production to another part of the world and
begin their practices over again?
11) If child labor violations or other labor abuses are discovered on a given supplier farm
will Industry commit to following a formal remediation process rather than abandon
the supplier altogether?
• How will the remediation/rehabilitation programs operate?
12) The Verification Working Group (VWG), while apparently intended to mirror the
independent oversight provided in the Kimberley process by the Clean Diamond Act,
and in other industries by multi-stakeholder bodies or other independent verifiers
such as the Fair Labor Association, Rainforest Alliance or Transfair USA, neither has
a formal structure like these organizations, nor does it appear to represent or be
accountable to a broad range of stakeholders in board, governance or makeup. Why
has the industry failed either to create an independent, stand-alone entity with a
credible and representative Board, or to develop a publicly accountable multi-
stakeholder initiative to oversee the certification process?
13) Given the fact that low world prices of cocoa is a result of overproduction in the
world market, how will increasing each farmer’s cocoa yield through Farmer Field
School training programs going to help farmers get a better price for their product to
improve their lives and that of their children?
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Transparency
All cocoa exporting corporations should be able to provide complete
evidence about their supply chain down to the farm level, throughout the world.
Cocoa companies must prove that they can chart their own supply chains if their
public commitment to worldwide monitoring under the Protocol is to have any
credibility. Importing corporations should publicly demand supply chain
transparency from the exporting corporations with which they do business.
B. Direct Supply Chain Management Reforms
Exporting corporations should be able to provide evidence showing that
they have trained their buyers and quality control specialists, who have direct
contact with the farmers, on what practices constitute violations of local and
international standards on the worst forms of child labor and forced labor, and on
methodologies to independently verify evidence provided by farmers and local
communities.
C. Support the Re-establishment of the International Cocoa Agreement
To ensure fair and stable pricing worldwide, industry should support and
encourage participation of key governments (incl. Ivory Coast and US) in the
International Cocoa Agreement and in particular support reinstatement of the
ICA's original language of achieving market stabilization and fair producer prices.
D. Contractual Commitments to Purchase and Remediation
Exporting corporations should provide a formal, written guarantee to all
farmers who have agreed to produce in accordance with core labor standards,
and/or to participate in the ILO/government programs, that states (a) their
commitment to purchase from that particular farm during a particular season and
(b) their commitment not to abandon the supplier if problems are discovered, but
instead to provide support and resources toward the development of solutions or
remediation of those problems.
E. Sustained Commitment to Fair Trade Cocoa
All cocoa industry stakeholders, be they importers, exporters,
manufacturers, or retailers, should commit to purchasing five percent of their total
cocoa purchases under Fair Trade Certified conditions, as defined by Fairtrade
Labelling Organizations International (FLO). This level of five percent should be
seen as a starting minimum. A sustained and growing commitment to Fair Trade
Certified cocoa will help bring participating cocoa farmers an added degree of
economic stability and a further incentive to grow and harvest their crops in
accordance with core labor standards.
F. Investment in Strengthening Farmer Bargaining Power
Industry companies (including exporters, importers, manufacturers and
retailers) should assist in bringing small farmers to the market by facilitating the
development of cooperatives. Farmers organized into cooperatives, particularly
Fair Trade cooperatives, can demand a higher price for their product and
eliminate wasteful payments to middlemen. Specifically, through the existing ICI,
Socodevi or other relevant initiatives working on the ground with cocoa producers,
an agreed-upon entity should assess the level of support necessary for the
expansion of fair trade cooperatives in this sector and should establish a process
to allow farmers themselves to determine and communicate their pre-financing
and capacity building needs.
G. Investment in Trafficked Children’s Communities of Origin
The problem of trafficked labor cannot be solved simply by policing the
end users; investments in the poor communities forced to send their youth into
bonded labor are also needed. Whether through the ICI or another existing NGO,
in this industry stakeholders must commit ongoing funding toward a plan that
assists former victims of trafficking who have been repatriated to their
communties, and that invests in those communities’ economic development to
provide local youth with meaningful employment options in future.
END NOTES
i
International Labor Organization. (2005). Available at:
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ipec/themes/cocoa/download/2005_02_cl_cocoa.pdf
ii
Coelho, Jeff. (2005) Senator Urges Cocoa Trade to Act on Child Labor. Reuters. Available at:
http://www.laborrights.org/press/ChildLabor/cocoa/cocoa060905.htm
iii
This point was echoed by the Chief Director of Ghana’s Ministry of Women and Children’s Affairs
(MOWAC), when, in a statement at a Consultative Meeting held by the ICI and the Ghana Cocoa Board in
2004, she noted that there is little that can be done for household income stability in cocoa production when
the price of cocoa on the commodity market is in constant flux, despite the persistent high global demand
for cocoa. See Worst Forms of Child Labor in the Cocoa Sector in Ghana, Report of the Consultative
Meeting, Novotel, Accra, pp. 37 - 39. (October 6, 2004).
iv
Chocolate Manufacturers Association. Protocol for the Growing and Processing of Cocoa Beans and
their Derivative Products in a Manner that Complies with ILO Convention 182 Concerning the Prohibition
and Immediate Actionf for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor. (“Cocoa Protocol”).
Retrieved from: www.harkin.senate.gov/specials/chocolate-protocol.pdf
v
International Cocoa Initiative (“ICI”), 2005. Progress Report Oct. 2004 – Jan. 2005. Retrieved From:
http://www.cocoainitiative.org/files/pdf/Progress%20report%20to%20January%202005.pdf
vi
ICI Newsletter, April – May 2006. Retrieved from
http://www.cocoainitiative.org/files/pdf/ICI_Newsletter_4_05-06_Eng.pdf
vii
Id
viii
Harkin-Engel Protocol, supra n. iv.
ix
ICI. Retrieved from: http://www.cocoainitiative.org/pages/default.asp?idm1=1&idm2=69&pageid=69
x
Harkin-Engel Protocol, supra n. iv.
xi
Chocolate Manufacturers Association. Press Release (2005). Retrieved from:
http://www.chocolateusa.org/news-and-initiatives/progress-report-on-cocoa-farming.asp
xii
World Cocoa Foundation (2005). Encouraging Sustainable, Responsible Cocoa Farming. Retrieved from:
http://responsiblecocoa.org/news/press-release-070105.aspx
xiii
Id.
xiv
Chocolate Manufacturers Association. Press Release (2005). Retrieved from:
http://www.chocolateusa.org/news-and-initiatives/progress-report-on-cocoa-farming.asp
xv
VWG. “Developing options for fair and sustainable financing of cocoa verification (July 2006)”.
Retrieved from: http://www.cocoaverification.org/en/archives/Financing_options_final_july.doc
xvi
Off, Carol, Bitter Chocolate: Investigating the Dark Side of the World’s Most Seductive Sweet. 2006.
Random House Canada.
xvii
VWG. “Developing options for fair and sustainable financing of cocoa verification (July 2006)”.
Retrieved from: http://www.cocoaverification.org/en/archives/Financing_options_final_july.doc
xviii
Verification Working Group (“VWG”). “Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)”. Retrieved from:
http://www.cocoaverification.org/en/archives/00000009.shtml#06
xix
VWG. “Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)”.
xx
Id.
xxi
VWG. “Verification System Overview Paper, February/March 2005”. Retrieved from:
http://www.cocoaverification.org/en/archives/00000008.shtml
xxii
VWG. “System Overview: Draft For Consultation, November 2004.” Retrieved from:
http://www.cocoaverification.org/en/archives/Design_overview_draft_for_consultation-1.pdf
xxiii
VWG. “Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)”.
xxiv
VWG. “Developing options for fair and sustainable financing of cocoa verification (July 2006)”.
Retrieved from: http://www.cocoaverification.org/en/archives/Financing_options_final_july.doc
xxv
VWG. “Verification System Overview Paper, February/March 2005”.
xxvi
Federal Business Opportunities. “Oversight of Public & Private Initiatives to Eliminate the Worst
Forms of Child Labor in the Cocoa Sector in Cote d’Ivoire & Guana [sic]”. Retrieved from:
http://www.fbo.gov/servlet/Documents/R/546136
xxvii
U.S. Department of Labor – Bureau of International Labor Affairs (USDOL/ILAB) (2006). “U.S.
Labor Department Funds Project to Evaluate Effectiveness of Anti-Child-Labor Efforts in the Cocoa
Industry.” Retrieved from: http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/ilab/ILAB20061723.htm
xxviii
Ibid.
xxix
Ibid.
xxx
ILO-IPEC, WACAP- A Overview. Available at www.treecrops.org/regional/child%20labor.pdf
xxxi
Harkin, Tom. Legislative Initiatives to Stop Abusive Child Labor, E-Journal USA (May 2005).
Available at http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/ites/0505/ijee/harkin.htm.
xxxii
Gockowski et al., Sustainable Tree Crop- Working Paper Series- Issue 1 (May 2006). Available at
http://www.treecrops.org/.
xxxiii
Id.
xxxiv
Id.
xxxv
See www.worldcocoafoundation.org for a full description of the IACC programs.
xxxvi
Off, Carol, Bitter Chocolate: Investigating the Dark Side of the World’s Most Seductive Sweet. 2006.
Random House Canada.
Critics: Chocolate financing Ivory Coast's Gbagbo
(AP) – Feb. 14, 2011
JOHANNESBURG (AP) — Some of the cocoa in that Valentine's Day chocolate probably came from a West African country where the man in power for a decade is still clinging to office. And activists say consumers might also think twice if they knew unpaid 5-year-olds helped produce it.
This year human rights advocates are harnessing the political crisis in Ivory Coast, the world's largest cocoa producer, to add momentum to an ongoing campaign to force the world's chocolate makers to improve their labor practices.
Supporters of the internationally recognized winner of Ivory Coast's election also have pushed for a cocoa ban in an effort to financially strangle incumbent leader Laurent Gbagbo, who the U.N. says lost the November election.
"It's clear that the taxes that come from cocoa go directly to keeping Gbagbo in power. That's why we called for an export ban and it seems to be working," said Patrick Achi, spokesman for internationally recognized winner Alassane Ouattara, who is now trying to run the country from a hotel.
Years of campaigning by "fair trade" consumers already have forced chocolate makers to sign onto to agreements to help clean up the cocoa supply chain. But little has changed in the decade since the U.S. Congress passed the Harkin-Engel Protocol to introduce a "no child slavery" label for chocolate marketed in the United States.
Some 1.8 million children aged 5 to 17 years work on cocoa farms in Ivory Coast and Ghana, according to the fourth annual report produced by Tulane University under contract to the U.S. Department of Labor to monitor progress in the protocol.
The report says 40 percent of the 820,000 children working in cocoa in Ivory Coast are not enrolled in school, and only about 5 percent of the Ivorian children are paid for their work.
"These companies are getting incredible profits while often the farmers are getting really pennies," said Emira Woods, co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, a Washington-based think tank.
Campaigns recently have begun targeting The Hershey Company because it is the only major chocolate producer in the world that hasn't made a commitment to use certified cocoa, activists say. Hershey's, though, says it is working to improve lives in local communities.
"Our focus is on-the-ground programs that promote sustainable livelihoods in West Africa," said Hershey's spokesman Kirk Saville. "Hershey's support for cocoa communities goes back more than 50 years. We have helped to develop more productive agriculture practices, to build educational and community resources and to eliminate exploitative labor practices."
But the Tulane University report on child labor in cocoa farms in Ivory Coast and Ghana found chocolate makers have reached less than 4 percent of cocoa-growing communities in Ivory Coast and less than 14 percent of communities in Ghana.
"The industry has invested far more in programs in Ghana, where the worst abuses are not quite as prevalent as in the Ivory Coast," said Timothy Newman, campaigns director of the Washington D.C.-based International Labor Rights Forum.
Newman also said children from the neighboring countries of Mali and Burkina Faso also continue to be trafficked to Ivorian farms, where 40 percent of the world's cocoa is produced.
Ivorian government statistics indicate that more than 37,000 children are forced to work, according to the U.N. International Labor Organization's Alexandre Soho, senior program officer for Africa on the elimination of child labor.
The industry says it has spent more than $75 million to support implementation of a cocoa certification system. However, the Tulane study found partners on the ground received only $5.5 million between 2001 and 2009, and that those working in Ivory Coast received only $1.2 million from the industry.
Activists argue that the answer is simple: pay farmers more and they will be able to afford to send their kids to school instead of to work. Most children are put to work on small family plots, often wielding dangerous tools like machetes and using hazardous substances such as insecticides.
But critics say that a chocolate boycott only hurts the farmers and their families, who are trying to make a living even if the wages are not "fair trade" ones.
"The essential problem from the very beginning, was that the large chocolate companies were hiding behind the Harkin-Engel Protocol which is an entirely voluntary agreement with no enforcement mechanism. As a result, they have been able to continually drag their feet in taking responsibility for labor rights abuses in their own cocoa supply chains," Newman said.
"Many of the initiatives developed under this process have never addressed the critical underlying issues that lead to egregious labor rights abuses like the low prices paid to cocoa farmers for their beans and the lack of negotiating power that small-scale farmers have in the global chocolate supply chain. Problems like these continue to fuel abuse."
Associated Press writer Marco Chown Oved contributed to this report from Abidjan, Ivory Coast.
